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Abstract We provide a detailed characterization of the optimal consumption stream for the
additive habit-forming utility maximization problem, in a framework of general discrete-time
incomplete markets and random endowments. This characterization allows us to derive the
monotonicity and concavity of the optimal consumption as a function of wealth, for several
important classes of incomplete markets and preferences. These results yield a deeper under-
standing of the fine structure of the optimal consumption and provide a further theoretical
support for the classical conjectures of Keynes (The general theory of employment, interest
and money. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1936).
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1 Introduction
The class of habit-forming expected utility models have become increasingly popular in
financial economics in recent years. While time-separable expected utility models are rou-
tinely found to be inconsistent with experimental evidence on choice under uncertainty (see
[28]), habit preferences tend to be efficient in explaining certain empirical phenomena, as
for instance, the celebrated equity premium puzzle (see for example [1,2,6]). A further ben-
eficial feature of the habit preferences is based on remarkably appealing grounds that are
intuitively reasonable from both an economic and psychological viewpoint. Individuals who
consume portions of their wealth over time are expected to develop habits which will have a
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decisive impact on their subsequent consumption behavior. In particular, the relative desire
to consume may be increased if one has become accustomed to high levels of consumption.
The paradigm of habit-forming utility functions captures the above observations by incorpo-
rating the impact of past consumption patterns on the individuals’ current and future policy
resolutions. A broad range of works are devoted to the study of habit-formation optimization
problems in various contexts and applications [4,5,8–10,13,16,21].
In the current article, we provide a detailed characterization of the optimal consumption
stream for the additive habit-forming utility maximization problem, in a framework of general
discrete-time incomplete markets and random endowments. This characterization allows us
to derive the monotonicity and concavity of the optimal consumption as a function of wealth,
for several important classes of incomplete markets and preferences.
Utility maximization problems in incomplete markets with the presence of random endow-
ments are known to be particularly challenging to handle in both discrete and continuous
time, even for standard, time-separable preferences. Since the pioneering work of Merton
[26], this problem has attracted the attention of many authors (see, e.g., [17,18,20,30,25]).
However, even though existence and uniqueness of the optimal consumption has been estab-
lished in a very general setting (see e.g., [21], and the references therein), very little is known
about the precise structure of the optimal consumption. As emphasized in the survey paper of
Zariphopoulou [32], further efforts are to be made in order to capture the qualitative structure
of the optimal consumption policy.
The presence of habits makes the problem more complicated due to the natural time-
inseparability of the underlying preferences. In the present article, we study an individ-
ual’s life-cycle consumption problem in a fairly general discrete-time setting. A decision
maker is represented by a stream of (unspanned) random endowments and an additive habit-
forming utility function. Agents are imposed to consume in an addictive fashion: Since the
utility function is defined on the positive half-line, consumption can never fall below the
benchmark level. The specification of habits in our model involves a combination of an
internal-external additive mechanism. Namely, the index indicating the standard of living of
an individual is a weighted average of individual’s past consumption plus some exogenous
(stochastic) factor. The agent is aiming to maximize the preference functional by trading in
an arbitrary incomplete financial market. In the above framework, we provide a novel char-
acterization of the optimal consumption stream by exploiting the concept of an aggregate
state price density, introduced by Malamud and Trubowitz [25]. We analyze some important
special cases and study particular qualitative properties of the consumption stream.
To the best of our knowledge, this article is the first one to study the habit-forming utility
maximization problem in the general framework of incomplete markets and random endow-
ments. Furthermore, unlike the traditional dynamic programming approach, our methodology
allows us to explicitly characterize the optimal consumption stream for such a general set-
ting. The approach introduced in this work can be employed in a future research dealing
with habits in discrete-time models. Finally, our results allow us to address several important
economic questions such as the monotonicity and concavity of the optimal consumption. In
the standard case of time-separable preferences, these properties have been investigated by
Carroll and Kimball [3] and Malamud and Trubowitz [25], providing a theoretical foundation
for the conjecture of Keynes [23] that the marginal propensity to consume is diminishing.
Our new techniques allows us to extend these results to the case of habit-forming preferences.
This extension is by no means trivial as the nature of first order conditions is significantly
more complicated due to the time-inseparability of the habit-forming preferences.
We now outline the contents of this article. Section 2 deals with preliminaries. In Sect. 2.1
we introduce the model of an incomplete financial market. The aggregate state price density
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and other related concepts are introduced in Sect. 2.2. In Sect. 2.3, we formulate the habit-
forming utility maximization problem and provide a first-phase solution (Theorem 2.3) in
terms of the aggregate state price density. Section 3 is concerned with a delicate analysis of the
utility maximization problem in various well-known models of financial markets and habit-
preferences. This section can serve as an introduction to the more complex ideas appearing
later in Sects. 4 and 5. Section 3.1 provides a solution to the optimization problem with prefer-
ences represented by a habit-forming power (constant relative risk aversion) utility, arbitrary
incomplete markets and deterministic endowments. In Sect. 3.2, we consider a habit-forming
exponential utility maximization problem in the case where agents can only trade one period
riskless bonds. Finally, in Sect. 3.3 we solve the utility maximization problem in complete
markets and arbitrary habit-forming preferences. Section 4 is devoted to the study of monoto-
nicity, and to the establishment of an extended characterization of the consumption for a large
class of incomplete markets. First, we explain in Sect. 4.1 why standard dynamic program-
ming methods cannot be directly applied to this monotonicity problem. Then, in Sect. 4.2,
the main result of Sect. 4 (Theorem 4.1) is presented: The monotonicity feature and an
explicit recursive scheme determining the optimal consumption is established for arbitrary
incomplete markets with a deterministic interest rate, and for idiosyncratically incomplete
markets (see Definition 4.1), in the setting of general additive habit-forming preferences. In
Sect. 5, we study the concavity of the optimal consumption as a function of wealth. That is,
we show that the richer an individual is, the smaller is the portion of the wealth consumed
by him, approving the hypothesis of Keynes [23]. Sections 5.1 and 5.2 are devoted to some
surprising counter-examples illustrating that concavity can only be anticipated for time-con-
sistent power utility functions. Finally, in Sect. 5.3, we formulate the main result of Sect. 5
(Theorem 5.2), showing the concavity property for idiosyncratically incomplete markets, and
incomplete markets of type C with a deterministic interest rate (see Definition 4.2).
2 Setting and preliminary results
The uncertainty in our model is captured by a finite probability space (,G, P) and a fil-
tration G0 := {φ,} ⊆ G1 ⊆ · · · ⊆ GT := G, where each sigma-field Gk corresponds to
the information revealed up to the period k. In the current article, adaptedness of stochastic
processes is always meant with respect to G := (Gk)k=0,...,T , unless otherwise is stated. For
each k, L2 (Gk) denotes the (finite-dimensional) space of all Gk-measurable random variables
endowed with the inner product 〈X, Y 〉 := E[X ·Y ], for X, Y ∈ L2(Gk). Each sigma-algebra
Gk is generated by a certain partition of , that is,
Gk = σ
(
B(k)1 , . . . , B
(k)
Nk
)
,
where B(k)1 , . . . , B
(k)
Nk are disjoint subsets of ,
⋃Nk
i=1 B
(k)
i =  and Nk = dim
(
L2 (Gk)
)
.
Furthermore, each partition is finer than the previous one, i.e., B(k)j =
⋃
i∈I (k)j B
(k+1)
i , for
k = 0, . . . , T − 1, where I (k)j ⊆ {1, . . . , Nk+1} are disjoint subsets, for j = 1, . . . , Nk .
Note that a random variable X is Gk measurable if and only if X is constant on each set B(k)i ,
for i = 1, . . . , Nk . For each X ∈ L2(Gk), we consider the associated multiplication oper-
ator TX : L2 (GT ) → L2 (GT ) defined by TX (Y ) = XY. In the standard basis of L2 (GT ),
the operator TX is a diagonal matrix with entries equal to X |B(k)1 , . . . , X |B(k)Nk that appear
according to a certain multiplicity. We will not distinguish between X and TX in the forth-
coming sections. Given a function f (X, Y ) : O × V → L2(GT ), where O ⊆ L2(Gk) is an
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open set (in the L2(Gk)-topology), for k = 0, . . . , T , and V is some non-empty subset of
L2(G0) × · · · × L2(GT ), we denote by
∂ f
∂ X
∣
∣
(X0,Z0)
Y0 = lim
ε→0
f (X0 + εY0, Z0) − f (X0, Z0)
ε
,
the directional derivative (Gâteaux differential) of f at the point (X0, Z0) ∈ O × V, applied
on the vector Y0 ∈ L2(Gk). In many cases, the operator ∂ f∂ X will be a multiplication operator,
and thus ∂ f
∂ X will be treated as a random variable. Derivatives of higher order are defined in
a similar manner.
2.1 The financial market
We adopt a standard discrete time model in the spirit of Chapter 2 in Duffie [11]. The finan-
cial market consists of N risky securities and one riskless bond. There are T + 1 periods:
0, . . . , T . At each date k = 0, . . . , T − 1, each security i = 1, . . . , N is available for trading
(selling or buying) at the price Sik and pays a dividend dik+1 in the next period k + 1. A
riskless bond bought in the period k = 0, . . . , T − 1, pays an interest rate rk+1 in the next
period k + 1. The price process is an N + 1 dimensional positive adapted process given by
Sk = (1, S1k , . . . , SNk ), k = 0, . . . , T − 1. We assume that no trading is executed in the last
period T , and incorporate this assumption by imposing ST = (0, . . . , 0) ∈ RN+1. The divi-
dend processes is an N + 1-dimensional adapted process denoted by dk = (rk, d1k , . . . , d Nk ),
for k = 1, . . . , T −1 and dT = (1+rT , d1T , . . . , d NT ). The interest rate (rk)k=1,...,T is assumed
to be a non-negative predictable process. We emphasize that (dk)k=1,...,T−1 and dT differ in
the first coordinate due to the assumption that ST vanishes. Moreover, the first coordinate in
(dk)k=1,...,T to (dk)k=1,...,T and (Sk)k=0,...,T−1 is reserved for the riskless bond. A trading
strategy, or portfolio, is an N +1 dimensional adapted process πk = (φk, π1k , . . . , π Nk ), k =
0, . . . , T . Here, φk and π ik represent the respective shares of the riskless bond and security
i , held during the period of time [k, k + 1). We set further π−1 = (0, . . . , 0) ∈ RN+1
and πT = (0, . . . , 0) ∈ RN+1. One notes that the standard assumption regarding the pre-
dictability of the portfolio is omitted due to a shift in the index of the price process. For a
given trading strategy π , the associated investment process I π := (I πk )k=0,...,T−1 and the
associated financial wealth processes Wπ := (Wπk )k=1,...,T are defined respectively by
I πk := φk +
N∑
i=1
π ik S
i
k = πk · Sk,
and
Wπk := φk−1(1 + rk) +
N∑
i=1
π ik−1(S
i
k + dik) = πk−1 · (Sk + dk) ,
where · denotes the standard inner product in RN+1. A state price density (SPD) is an adapted
process (Rk)k=0,...,T that satisfies
Rk Sik = E
[
Rk+1(Sik+1 + dik+1)|Gk
]
,
and
Rk = E
[
Rk+1(1 + rk+1)|Gk
]
,
for all i = 1, . . . , N and k = 0, . . . , T − 1.
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Remark 2.1 (i) In our setting, a SPD is allowed to take negative values.
(ii) Given an investment process (I πk )k=0,...,T−1, a wealth process (Wπk )k=0,...,T and an
arbitrary SPD (Rk)k=0,...,T , the following relation
Rk I πk = E
[
Rk+1Wπk+1|Gk
] (1)
holds for all k = 0, . . . , T − 1.
The following is assumed throughout the whole article.
Assumption 1 There is no arbitrage (NA) in the market. That is, if, Wπk − I πk ≥ 0, P−a.s
for all k = 0, . . . , T and some portfolio π , then, Wπk − I πk = 0, P−a.s for all k = 0, . . . , T .
We recall the standard classification of financial markets.
Definition 2.1 A market is complete if every adapted process (Yk)k=1,...,T is replicable, i.e.,
there exists a trading strategy π such that Yk = I πk − Wπk for all k = 1, . . . , T . Otherwise,
the market is called incomplete.
Finally, we state the following classical result in a discrete time setting.
Theorem 2.1 The NA condition is equivalent to the existence of a positive SPD. A NA market
is complete if and only if there exists a unique (up to a multiplication by a constant) positive
SPD.
Proof of Theorem 2.1 See the proof of Theorem 3.3 in Dallang et al. [7], and the proof of
Corollary 4.1 in Taqqu and Willinger [31]. unionsq
2.2 The aggregate state price density
The current subsection is devoted to the introduction of certain important notions that will
be crucial for carrying out our analysis. We start with the following definition.
Definition 2.2 (i) The financial wealth space, or payoff space at period k is given by
Lk = {Wπk = (Sk + dk)πk−1|πk−1 ∈ L2 (Gk−1)},
for all k = 1, . . . , T, and L0 = {0}.
(ii) We denote by
PkL : L2(GT ) → Lk
the orthogonal projection of the space L2(GT ) onto the payoff space Lk, for all k =
0, . . . , T .
Remark 2.2 (i) Since riskless bonds are available for trading at each period, it follows
that L2 (Gk−1) ⊆ Lk ⊆ L2 (Gk), for all k = 1, . . . , T .
(ii) In contrast to conditional expectations, the orthogonal projection PkL is not neces-
sarily positivity preserving (i.e., not mapping non-negative random variables to non-
negative ones). In fact, PkL is positivity preserving if and only if Lk = L2 (Hk) for
some sigma-algebra Gk−1 ⊆ Hk ⊆ Gk (See Theorem 3.2 in [25]). In the latter case, the
market is called market of type C (see Sects. 4.2 and 5.3 for certain results involving
this type of markets).
The following properties will be used extensively in the sequel.
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Lemma 2.1 (i) For every X, Y ∈ L2(GT ) and k = 1, . . . , T , we have
E
[
PkL [X ] Y
]
= E
[
X PkL [Y ]
]
.
(ii) For every k = 1, . . . , T, Y ∈ L2(GT ) and X ∈ L2(Gk−1), we have
PkL [XY ] = X PkL [Y ] .
(iii) For all X, Y ∈ L2(GT ), k = 0, . . . , T − 1 and m > k, we have
E
[
PmL [X ] Y |Gk
] = E [X PmL [Y ] |Gk
]
.
(iv) If PkL [X V ] = 0, for some positive random variable X ∈ L2 (GT ) and some V ∈ Lk,
then V = 0.
Proof of Lemma 2.1 (i) The assertion follows from the fact that PkL is a self-adjoint oper-
ator.
(ii) First, note that X PkL [Y ] ∈ Lk by definition. Therefore, the statement becomes
PkL
[
XY − X PkL [Y ]
] = 0, or equivalently, E [(XY − X PkL [Y ]
)
Z
] = 0, for all
Z ∈ Lk . Since X Z ∈ Lk, part (i) implies that E
[
X Z PkL [Y ]
] = E [XY Z ] . This
completes the proof of (ii).
(iii) We need to prove that E [PmL [X ] Y Z
] = E [PmL [Y ] X Z
]
, for all Z ∈ L2(Gk). It
follows by (ii) that Z PmL [X ] = PmL [Z X ]. Therefore, by combining this with (i) we
obtain that E
[
PmL [X ] Y Z
] = E [PmL [X Z ] Y
] = E [PmL [Y ] X Z
]
, as required.
(iv) Note that by (i) we have 0 = E [PkL [X V ] V
] = E [X V 2]. Since X > 0, we conclude
that V = 0. unionsq
The concept of aggregate SPD is a fundamental tool in the present work.
Theorem 2.2 There exists a unique SPD (Mk)k=0,...,T such that Mk ∈ Lk, for all k =
1, . . . , T . Moreover,
Mk =
k∏
l=1
PlL
[
Rl
Rl−1
]
,
for all k = 1, . . . , T, where (Rk)k=0,...,T is an arbitrary positive SPD. In particular,
(Mk)k=0,...,T is independent of the choice of (Rk)k=0,...,T . The process (Mk)k=0,...,T is called
the aggregate SPD.
Proof of Theorem 2.2 See the proof of Lemma 2.5 in Malamud and Trubowitz [25]. unionsq
Note that the aggregate SPD is not necessarily a positive process. For simplicity, we will
consider only financial markets that satisfy the following convention.
Assumption 2 The aggregate SPD does not vanish, i.e., Mk 
= 0, P−a.s, for all k =
1, . . . , T .
2.3 Utility maximization with additive habits
The decision maker in our model is characterized by an endowment stream  := (k)k=0,...,T
which is assumed to be a non-negative adapted process, and a habit-forming utility function
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U . The individual’s objective is to maximize her utility function from consumption by select-
ing a suitable investment policy. Given a trading strategy π , the corresponding consumption
process labeled by cπ := (cπk )k=0,...,T , is defined by
ck = cπk := k + Wπk − I πk . (2)
The preference functional of the agent is given by
U (c0, . . . , cT ) :=
T∑
k=0
E
[
uk
(
ck −
k−1∑
l=0
β
(k)
l cl − hk
)]
,
where β := (β(k)l )l=0,...,k−1, for k = 1, . . . , T, are non-negative constants that represent the
strength of the habit formation affect on the individual, and (hk)k=0,...,T is a non-negative
adapted process that might be interpreted as a quantity which measures habits of exogenous
type, or as a mending factor that appears due to a noisy estimation of the consumption’s
past history. For notational convenience, we set β(0)−1 = h0 = 0 and β(k)k = 1, for k =
1, . . . , T . We assume that each function uk : [0,∞) → R is a strictly increasing, concave,
C2-smooth and satisfies the Inada conditions: u′k(0) := limx→0 u′k(x) = ∞, and u′k(∞) :=
limx→∞ u′k(x) = 0. Note that the latter convention implies that feasible consumption streams
are non-negative and that individuals are addictive, that is, ck ≥ ∑k−1l=0 β(k)l cl + hk ≥ 0, for
all k = 0, . . . , T . For each consumption plan (ck)k=0,...,T we define the associated perturbed
consumption process (c(k, β, h))k=0,...,T by
c(k, β, h) := ck −
k−1∑
l=0
β
(k)
l cl − hk . (3)
Note that the utility functions in the current setting are not restricted by the assumption that
uk(x) = e−ρku(x), for all k = 0, . . . , T , where u(x) is some function satisfying the Inada
conditions. This leads to time-inconsistency, as for instance in Ekeland and Lazrak [14], and
Karp [22]. The following subset of L2(G0) × L2(G1) × · · · × L2(GT ) will be referred to as
the set of budget constraints
B (, β, h) :=
{
(c0, . . . , cT )|ck = cπk for some portfolio π and c(k, β, h) ≥ 0 for all k = 0, . . . , T
}
.
We assume throughout the article that the set B (, β, h) has a non-empty interior. The utility
maximization problem of the agent is
sup
(c0,...,cT )∈B(,β,h)
U (c0, . . . , cT ). (4)
The following proposition provides a convenient parametrization of the set of budget con-
straints.
Lemma 2.2 Let (ck)k=0,...,T be an adapted process that satisfies the condition c(k, β, h) ≥
0, for all k = 0, . . . , T . Then, (ck)k=0,...,T is a feasible consumption stream, i.e.,
(c0, . . . , cT ) ∈ B (, β, h), if and only if there exists a unique wealth process (Wk)k=0,...,T ,
i.e., Wk ∈ Lk for all k = 0, . . . , T and WT+1 = 0, such that
ck = k + Wk − E
[
Mk+1
Mk
Wk+1|Gk
]
, (5)
123
74 Math Finan Econ (2011) 5:67–99
for all k = 0, . . . , T . Furthermore, if π is some trading strategy such that ck = cπk for all
k = 0, . . . , T , then Wk = Wπk and E
[
Mk+1
Mk Wk+1|Gk
]
= I πk , for all k = 0, . . . , T . The
wealth process (Wk)k=0,...,T is uniquely determined by
Wk =
T∑
l=k
E
[
Ml
Mk
(
cl − l
)|Gk
]
, (6)
for all k = 1, . . . , T .
This lemma is analogous to Lemma 2.7 in Malamud and Trubowitz [25]. We present its
proof for the reader’s convenience.
Proof of Lemma 2.2 The first part of the statement follows by (1). Let us now show that (6)
holds by backward induction. The case k = T follows from (5). Assume that (6) holds for all
k > m, and let us show it for k = m. By combining Eq. 5 with the induction assumption, we
get that Wm = cm − m + E[ Mm+1Mm Wm+1|Gm] = cm − m +
∑T
l=m+1 E[ Mm+1Mm E[ MlMm+1 (cl −
l)|Gm+1]|Gm] = ∑Tl=m E[ MlMm (cl − l)|Gm]. This accomplishes the proof. unionsq
The next statement establishes a first step in the characterization of the optimal consumption
stream in the setting of general incomplete markets.
Theorem 2.3 There exists a unique solution to the utility maximization problem (4). The
optimal consumption stream (c∗k )k=0,...,T and the corresponding financial wealth process
(W ∗k )k=0,...,T are uniquely determined as the solutions of the following system of equations:
PkL
[
Rk(c0, . . . , cT )
Rk−1(c0, . . . , cT )
]
= Mk
Mk−1
, (7)
for k = 1, . . . , T , where
Rk(c0, . . . , cT ) := u′k (c(k, β, h)) −
T∑
m=k+1
β
(m)
k E
[
u′m (c(m, β, h))
∣∣Gk
]
,
(c(k, β, h))k=0,...,T is defined in (3),
ck = k + Wk − E
[
Mk+1
Mk
Wk+1|Gk
]
, (8)
and Wk ∈ Lk , for all k = 0, . . . , T . The process (Rk(c∗0, . . . , c∗T ))k=0,...,T is a positive SPD.
Proof of Theorem 2.3 The compactness of B(, β, H) (which follows by the NA assump-
tion) combined with the continuity and the strict concavity of the function U (c0, . . . , cT )
implies existence and uniqueness. Set c∗(k, β, hk) := c∗k −
∑k−1
l=0 β
(k)
l c
∗
l −hk and observe that
the Inada condition u′k(0) = ∞ implies that c∗(k, β, hk) > 0, P−a.s, for all k = 0, . . . , T .
We turn to showing that (c∗k )k=0,...,T is determined as the unique solution of the system of
Eqs. 7 and 8. Note that Lemma 2.2 implies that Eq. 8 can replace the budget constraint
(c∗0, . . . , c∗T ) ∈ B (, β, h). Next, due to the fact that (c∗0, . . . , c∗T ) ∈ int (B (, β, h)) and
that a local maximum of a strict concave function is a global maximum, it follows that
(c∗0, . . . , c∗T ) is determined as the unique solution of the corresponding first order conditions,
which are given by
Rk(c0, . . . , cT )Sik = E
[
Rk+1(c0, . . . , cT )
(
Sik+1 + dik+1
)
|Gk
]
,
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and
Rk(c0, . . . , cT ) = E
[
Rk+1(c0, . . . , cT ) (1 + rk+1) |Gk
]
,
for all i = 0, . . . , N and k = 0, . . . , T − 1. Thereby, we conclude that the process
(Rk(c∗0, . . . , c∗T ))k=0,...,T is a SPD. Now, observe that RT (c∗0, . . . , c∗T ) = u′T (c∗(T, β, h)) >
0 by definition, and hence the positivity of the process (Rk(c∗0, . . . , c∗T ))k=0,...,T follows by
the above first order conditions and the fact that the processes (Sk)k=0,...,T , (dk)k=1,...,T and
(rk)k=1,...,T are positive. Finally, the proof is accomplished by applying Theorem 2.2 on
(Rk(c∗0, . . . , c∗T ))k=0,...,T and combining this with the convention that the aggregate SPD
(Mk)k=0,...,T does not vanish. unionsq
For the sake of convenience, the following notation will be used in the sequel.
Definition 2.3 The process (M˜k)k=0,...,T , given by
M˜k = Mk +
T∑
l=k+1
l−k∑
j=1
∑
k≤s j <···<s1<l
β(l)s1 β
(s1)
s2 · · ·β
(s j )
k E
[
Ml
∣
∣Gk
]
, (9)
is referred as the aggregate perturbed SPD.
3 Optimal consumption for some special classes of financial markets and preferences
The system of first order Eq. 7 appearing in Theorem 2.3 is highly non-linear and closed form
solutions can only be obtained in some special settings. In the current section, we study sev-
eral such cases. As it will be demonstrated in the subsequent three subsections, these closed
form solutions provide a detailed description of the structure of the optimal consumption
stream in the presence of habits, and allow illustrating certain important characteristics.
3.1 Power utility with no random endowment
Consider an agent represented by a power utility uk(x) = e−ρk x1−γ1−γ , for k = 0, . . . , T . Here,
γ and ρ stand for the degree of risk aversion and impatience respectively. Assume that the
agent receives only an initial endowment, that is, 0 ≥ 0, and k = 0, for all k = 1, . . . , T .
Assume further that no exogenous habits are involved, namely, hk = 0, for all k = 1, . . . , T .
We denote by ck(0), Wk(0) and Ik(0) the optimal consumption, wealth and investment
processes respectively, viewed as functions of the initial endowment 0. The solution to the
corresponding utility maximization problem is given explicitly in the following statement.
Theorem 3.1 Under the above assumptions, the optimal consumption and investment poli-
cies are linear increasing functions of the wealth, that is,
ck(0) = Ak Wk(0); c0(0) = A00, (10)
and
Ik(0) = (1 − Ak) Wk(0); I0(0) = (1 − A0) 0, (11)
for all k = 1, . . . , T, where (Ak)k=0,...,T is an adapted processes taking values in the interval
(0, 1], which is given by
Ak = ck(1)
ck(1) + E
[ Mk+1
Mk Wk+1(1)|Gk
] .
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Moreover, the corresponding wealth process (Wk(0))k=1,...,T satisfies
Wk+1(0) = Wk+1(1)
ck(1)
ck(0),
for all k = 0, . . . , T − 1.
Proof of Theorem 3.1 First, observe that the first order conditions (7) in Theorem 2.3 imply
that ck(0) = ck(1)0 and Wk(0) = Wk(1)0, for all k = 0, . . . , T . This implies that
Wk+1(0) = Wk+1(1)ck (1) ck(0), for all k = 0, . . . , T − 1, and by plugging this into Eq. 8, we
conclude the validity of (10). Next, notice that relation (11) holds due to Lemma 2.2. We
claim now that E
[ Mk+1
Mk Wk+1(1)|Gk
]
> 0, P−a.s., for all k = 0, . . . , T − 1. This is unclear
a-priori since the aggregate SPD (Mk)k=0,...,T is not necessarily positive. To this end, set
0 = 1 and note that by (8), we have WT (1) = cT (1) > 0. Therefore, by item (ii) in Remark
(2.1), we get
E
[
MT
MT−1
WT (1)
∣
∣GT−1
]
= E
[
RT
RT−1
WT (1)
∣
∣GT−1
]
> 0,
where (Rk)k=0,...,T is an arbitrary positive SPD. Next, note that (2.2) implies that
WT−1(1) = cT−1(1) + E
[
MT
MT−1 WT (1)
∣∣GT−1
]
> 0. Hence, as above, we conclude that
E
[
MT−1
MT−2 WT−1(1)
∣∣GT−2
]
= E
[
RT−1
RT−2 WT−1(1)
∣∣GT−2
]
> 0. The rest of the claim can be
proved analogously by using backward induction. unionsq
3.2 Exponential utility and one period risk free bonds
Consider a market which consists only of one period risk free bonds represented by an interest
rate process (rk)k=1,...,T . One checks that Lk = L2(Gk−1) (in particular, this implies that
PkL [·] = E
[·|Gk−1
]), and Mk = ∏ki=1(1 + ri )−1, for all k = 1, . . . , T . The agent is repre-
sented by an exponential utility uk : R → R−, uk(x) = −e−γ x , k = 0, . . . , T, where γ > 0
stands for the degree of risk aversion. We emphasize that this specification of preferences is
exceptional for the current article, since the utility function is defined on the whole real-line R.
Note however that the Inada conditions hold in the following modified form, u′k(−∞) = +∞
and u′k(+∞) = 0, k = 0, . . . , T . The exogenous habits are characterized by the process
(hk)k=0. The internal habits coefficients are assumed to be homogeneous and the habit con-
sumption level is assumed to depend only on last period consumption, i.e., β(k)k−1 = β ≥ 0,
and β(k)l = 0, for all k = 1, . . . , T, and l = 0, . . . , k − 2. The latter framework is in fact the
most prevalent specification of a habit forming utility function in the discrete time literature
(see e.g. [1,15,29]). The utility maximization problem in the current setting is similar to
the one in (4), apart from the evident distinction that the process (ck)k=0,...,T is allowed to
take negative values. Let (k)k=0,...,T represent the (possibly random) endowment stream
of the agent. The optimal consumption, investment and wealth are denoted respectively by
(c∗k )k=0,...,T , (I ∗k )k=0,...,T and (W ∗k )k=1,...,T .
Theorem 3.2 Under the above assumptions, the optimal consumption and investment pro-
cesses are determined explicitly through the following recursive scheme,
c∗k = lk W ∗k + mkc∗k−1 + nk(k, . . . , T ), (12)
I ∗k = (1 − lk) W ∗k − mkc∗k−1 + k − nk(k, . . . , T ), (13)
W ∗k = l ′kc∗k−1 + m′kc∗k−2 + n′k(k, . . . , T ), (14)
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for all k = 1, . . . , T ,
c∗0 = l00 + m0
n′0
m′0
,
and
I ∗0 = 0 − c∗0
where lk, mk, nk(k, . . . , T ), l ′k, m′k and n′k(k, . . . , T ) are given explicitly in (16), (17),
(18) and (19). Furthermore, we have
0 < lk ≤ 1, (15)
for all k = 0, . . . , T .
Proof of Theorem 3.2 As in the proof of Theorem 2.3, one checks that the optimal consump-
tion stream is determined as the unique solution of the system of Eqs. 7 and 8. Now, note
that Eq. 8 becomes ck = k + Wk − (1 + rk+1)−1Wk+1, for k = 0, . . . , T . Thus it is evident
that lT = 1, mT = 0 and nT (T ) = T . It is easy to check by backward induction that Eq. 7
admits the form
E
[
e−γ (ck−βck−1−hk )Xk
∣∣Gk−1
]
= e−γ (ck−1−βck−2−hk−1),
for k = 1, . . . , T , where (Xk)k=1,...,T is given by
Xk = β + 1∑T
j=k
∏T
i= j (1 + ri )−1 βT− j
.
Finally, the above formula combined with Eq. 8 implies that
l ′k =
1 + β − mk
lk
; m′k = −
β
lk
, (16)
n′k(k, . . . , T ) =
log
(
E
[
exp (γ (hk − nk(k, . . . , T ))) Xk
∣∣Gk−1
]) − γ hk−1
γ lk
, (17)
lk−1 = 11 + (1 + rk)−1l ′k
; mk−1 = − (1 + rk)
−1m′k
1 + (1 + rk)−1l ′k
, (18)
nk−1(k−1, . . . , T ) = k−1 − (1 + rk)
−1n′k(k, . . . , T )
1 + (1 + rk)−1l ′k
, (19)
for k = 1, . . . , T . Finally, one checks by induction that lk ∈ [0, 1), k = 0, . . . , T . unionsq
3.3 Complete markets
By definition, the relation Lk = L2(Gk) (and in particular, PkL [·] = E [·|Gk]) holds for
all k = 1, . . . , T, in a complete market setting. Moreover, the aggregate SPD is the unique
positive SPD in the market. The next statement treats the case of general habit-forming utility
functions.
Theorem 3.3 The optimal consumption stream
(
c∗k
)
k=0,...,T is determined explicitly through
the following recursive scheme,
c∗k =
k−1∑
l=0
β
(k)
l c
∗
l + hk +
(
u′k
)−1
(
u′k−1
(
c∗(k − 1, β, hk−1)
) M˜k
M˜k−1
)
, (20)
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for all k = 1, . . . , T , and
T∑
k=0
E
[
c∗k
Mk
Mk−1
]
=
T∑
k=0
E
[
k
Mk
Mk−1
]
, (21)
where
(
M˜k
)
k=0,...,T is given in (9), and (c∗(k, β, h))k=0,...,T is defined as in (2.3).
Proof of Theorem 3.3 Since the market is complete, the budget constraint Eq. 8 are redun-
dant for k = 1, . . . , T and thus the only relevant budget constraint is Eq. 8 for k = 0.
This equation can be rewritten as (21) by identity (6) in Lemma 2.2. The first order condi-
tions (7) can be transformed into (20) by combining the identity PkL
[ · ] = E[ · |Gk
]
, k =
1, . . . , T, with some routine, but somewhat tedious, algebraic manipulations (similarly as in
Lemma 4.2). unionsq
We concentrate now on power utility functions. That is, uk(x) = e−ρk x1−γk1−γk , for k =
0, . . . , T , where (γk)k=0,...,T is a sequence of non-negative numbers that represent the risk
aversion of the agent, and ρ indicates the impatience coefficient. In contrast to the previous
two subsections, the optimal consumption stream here may demonstrate a non-linear struc-
ture. The next result illustrates the latter phenomenon, and presents an analytical solution to
the associated utility maximization problem.
Theorem 3.4 (i) Under the above assumptions, we have
c∗k = ψk
(
W ∗k
)
,
for k = 1, . . . , T , and c∗0 = ψ0 (0) where, ψk : L2(Gk) → L2(Gk) is a smooth
function which is given explicitly by (28), for all k = 0, . . . , T . The derivative dψk is a
multiplication operator such that 0 < (dψk)Wk (0,...,k−1) ≤ 1. Furthermore, we have
Ik(0, . . . , k−1) = ψ̂k (Wk(0, . . . , k−1)) ,
for k = 1, . . . , T and I0(0) = ψ̂k (0). Here, ψ̂k : L2(Gk) → L2(Gk) is given by
ψ̂k(X) = k + X − ψk(X), for all k = 0, . . . , T . In particular, the optimal consump-
tion/investment is an increasing function of the wealth.
(ii) If γ0 = · · · = γT , then, the optimal consumption/investment stream is a linear increasing
function of the wealth. More precisely,
ψk(X) =
∑k
i=0 D
(i)
k
∑T
i=0 F
(i)
k
X +
∑k
i=0 D
(i)
k
∑T
i=0 F
(i)
k
T∑
j=k
E
[
M j
Mk
 j
∣∣Gk
]
+
k∑
i=1
α
(k)
i hi ,
where D(i)k , α
(k)
i and F
(i)
k are given by (23), (24) and (27) respectively.
Proof of Theorem 3.4 (i) Theorem 3.3 implies that (c∗k )k=0,...,T satisfies the equation
c∗k −
k−1∑
j=0
β
(k)
j c
∗
j − hk = (c∗0)γ0/γk e−
ρk
γk (M˜k)−1/γk ,
for k = 1, . . . , T . By using routine algebraic operations, one obtains that
c∗k =
k∑
i=0
D(i)k (c
∗
0)
γ0/γi +
k∑
i=0
α
(k)
i hi , (22)
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for k = 1, . . . , T , where
D(i)k = δ(i)k e−
ρi
γi
(
M˜i
)−1/γi
. (23)
The processes (δ(i)k )k=1,...,T ;i=1,....,k and (α
(i)
k )k=1,...,T ;i=1,....,k are determined through
the following recursive scheme: δ(0)0 = 1, δ(0)1 = β(1)0 , δ(1)1 = 1, α(1)1 = 1, and
α
(k)
i =
k−1∑
j=i
β
(k)
j α
( j)
i ; α(k)k = 1, (24)
δ
(i)
k =
k−1∑
j=i
β
(k)
j δ
(i)
j ; δ(k)k = 1, (25)
for all k = 2, . . . , T and i = 0, . . . , k − 1. Next, identity (6) in Lemma 2.2 yields
W ∗k =
T∑
i=0
F (i)k (c
∗
0)
γ0/γi −
T∑
j=k
E
[
M j
Mk
 j
∣
∣Gk
]
, (26)
where
F (i)k =
T∑
j=max(i,k)
E
[
M j
Mk
D(i)j
∣∣Gk
]
, (27)
for all k = 1, . . . , T and i = 0, . . . , T . Equations 22 and 26 allow to establish
a correspondence between the optimal consumption and the wealth as follows. Let
fk : L2+(Gk) → L2(Gk) be defined by fk(X) =
∑T
i=0 F
(i)
k X
γ0
γi −∑Tj=k E
[
M j
Mk  j
∣∣Gk
]
.
Since each function of the form x → xη is increasing, for an arbitrary η ≥ 0, it follows
that fk is an invertible function. Let us denote by gk the inverse of fk , which is defined
on I m( fk) ⊆ L2(Gk). Next, consider the function
ψk(X) =
k∑
i=0
D(i)k g
γ0
γi
k (X) +
k∑
i=0
α
(k)
i hi , (28)
and note that c∗k = ψk(W ∗k ). Observe that (d fk)X Y =
∑T
i=0 F
(i)
k
γ0
γi
X
γ0
γi
−1Y, hence,
(d fk)X = ∑Ti=0 F (i)k γ0γi X
γ0
γi
−1 is a multiplication operator. Therefore, we conclude
that
(dgk)X Y =
( T∑
i=0
F (i)k
γ0
γi
(gk(X))
γ0
γi
−1
)−1
Y.
The definition of ψk implies that
(dψk)X Y =
k∑
i=0
D(k)i
γ0
γi
(gk(X))γ0/γi −1(dgk)X Y,
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which implies in particular that (dψk)X is a multiplication operator. It is left to check
that 0 < (dψk)W ∗k ≤ 1. To this end, note that
(dψk)W ∗k =
∑k
i=0 D
(i)
k
γ0
γi
(
c∗0
) γ0
γi
−1
∑T
i=0 F
(i)
k
γ0
γi
(
c∗0
) γ0
γi
−1 ,
and the claim follows since D(i)k ≤ F (i)k , for all i = 0, . . . , T and k = 0, . . . , T .
Finally, observe that Eqs. 28 and 21 imply that
ψ0(0) +
T∑
i=0
T∑
k=i
E
[
Mk D(i)k
]
ψ
γ0/γi
0 (0) − 0 −
T∑
k=1
k∑
i=1
E
[
Mkα(k)i hi
]
= 0,
and thus by differentiating this equation with respect to 0, we obtain that
0 < ψ ′0(0) =
1
1 + ∑Ti=1
∑T
k=i E
[
Mk D(i)k
]
ψ
γ0/γi −1
0 (0)
< 1.
(ii) The assertion follows easily by part (i).
unionsq
4 General incomplete markets: explicit solution and monotonicity
In this section we study in more detail an individual’s habit-forming utility maximization
problem in a general setting of incomplete markets. This general framework requires a more
delicate investigation than the one exhibited in the previous section, due to the presence of
random endowments, additive habits and general preferences. We will provide an analytic
solution to the utility maximization problem through an explicit recursive construction based
on the implicit function theorem. We will use this construction to investigate monotonicity
properties of the optimal consumption/investment policy.
4.1 Dynamic programming fails in showing monotonicity
A conventional approach to tackle the monotonicity problem would be by using dynamic
programming (see [27]). Despite that this general methodology provides a useful character-
ization of the controls involved in the optimization problem, it cannot be directly applied to
proving monotonicity in the current setting. We will illustrate this below for the problem of
detecting the dependence of the initial consumption c0(0) on the initial endowment 0.
Consider the value function associated with the utility maximization problem (4) viewed
as a function of 0:
V0(0) := sup
π∈0
T∑
k=0
E
[
uk
(
c(k, β, h, π)
)]
. (29)
Here, c(k, β, h, π) := cπk −
∑k−1
j=0 β
(k)
j c
π
j − hk ; cπk is defined analogously to (2); and 0
denotes the set of all trading strategies π = (π0, . . . , πT−1, 0) such that c(k, β, h, π) ≥ 0,
for all k = 0, . . . , T . Note that cπ0 depends on 0, and thus each c(k, β, h, π) depends on
0, unless β(k)0 = 0. Similarly, for each k = 1, . . . , T , and fixed portfolio (up to the period
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k − 1) π̂o, . . . , π̂k−1, we consider the Gk−measurable random variable:
Vk(0, π̂o, . . . , π̂k−1)
= sup
π∈(π̂o,...,π̂k−1)
uk (c(k, β, h, π)) +
T∑
j=k+1
E
[
u j (c( j, β, h, π)) |Gk
]
,
where (π̂o, . . . , π̂k−1) ⊆ 0 denotes the set of all trading strategies of the form
(π̂o, . . . , π̂k−1, πk, . . . , πT−1, 0). Since at the maturity date we have πT = 0, it follows
that
VT (0, π̂0, . . . , π̂T−1) = u (c (T, β, h, π̂)) ,
where π̂ = (π̂0, . . . , π̂T−1, 0). Let us assume for simplicity that the market excludes
redundant assets. This implies the existence of a unique optimal portfolio π(0) =
(π0(0), . . . , πT (0)). Furthermore, it follows (as in Sect. 4.2) that each πk(0) is compo-
nent-wise differentiable with respect to 0. We denote by π ′k(0) the corresponding gradient.
Now, recall that c(0, β, h, π) = 0 − π0 · S0, hence, the dynamic programming principle
implies that
V0(0) = sup
π0,(π0)
=∅
{u (0 − π0 · S0) + E [V1 (0, π0)]}
= u (0 − π0(0) · S0) + E [V1 (0, π0(0))] .
Similar arguments yield
Vk (0, π̂0, . . . , π̂k−1) = sup
πk ,(π̂0,...,π̂k−1,πk )
=∅
(
uk (c (k, β, h, π))
−E [Vk (0, π̂0, . . . , π̂k−1, πk(0))
∣∣Gk
] )
,
and
Vk (0, π0(0), . . . , πk−1(0)) = uk (c(k, β, h, π(0)))
+E [Vk (0, π0(0), . . . , πk−1(0), πk(0))
∣∣Gk
]
,
for all k = 1, . . . , T . Observe that VT (0, π̂0, . . . , π̂T−1) is differentiable with respect to each
coordinate, by definition. Therefore, the above recursive relation combined with the differ-
entiability of π(0) implies that each Vk (0, π0, . . . , πk−1) is differentiable with respect to
all coordinates. We claim that
V ′0(0) = u′0(c0(0)) −
T∑
k=1
β
(k)
0 E
[
u′k(c(k, β, h, π(0)))
]
, (30)
where (ck(0))k=0,...,T denotes the optimal consumption stream. To this end, differentiate
Eq. 31 with respect to 0, and observe that
V ′0(0) = u′(c0(0))
(
1 − π ′0(0) · S0
)
+E
[
∂V1
∂0
(0, π0(0))
]
+ E
[
∂V1
∂π0
(0, π0(0)) · π ′0(0)
]
,
where
∂V1
∂π0
(0, π0(0)) =
(
∂V1
∂φ0
(0, π0(0)) ,
∂V1
∂π10
(0, π0(0)) , . . . ,
∂V1
∂π N0
(0, π0(0))
)
.
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Since π0(0) is the optimal control, the first-order conditions imply that the following equa-
tion is satisfied (component-wise):
u′0 (0 − π0(0) · S0) S0 = E
[
∂V1
∂0
(0, π0(0))
]
.
Therefore, we get
V ′0 (0) = u′(c0(0)) + E
[
∂V1
∂0
(0, π0(0))
]
.
We turn now to computing the random variable ∂V1
∂0
(0, π0(0)) explicitly. As before, one
checks that
∂Vk
∂0
(0, π0(0), . . . , πk−1(0)) = −β(k)0 u′(c(k, β, h, π(0)))
+E
[
∂Vk+1
∂0
(0, π0(0), . . . , πk−1(0), πk(0)))|Gk
]
, (31)
for all k = 0, . . . , T − 1. By definition, we have
∂VT
∂0
(0, π0(0), . . . , πT−1(0) = −β(T )0 u′T (c(T, β, h, π(0))) .
Backward induction implies that
E
[
∂V1
∂0
(0, π0(0))
]
= −
T∑
k=1
β
(k)
0 E
[
u′k(c(k, β, h, π(0)))
]
.
This proves the validity of (30). Assume that there are no habits, i.e., β(k)j = 0, and hk = 0,
for all k = 0, . . . , T and j = 0, . . . , k − 1. Then, (30) takes the form
V ′0(0) = u′0(c0(0)).
Note that the value function V0(0) is concave, since uk is concave, for all k = 0, . . . , T ,
and thus we obtain that c′0(0) = V
′′
0 (0)
u′′0(c0(0))
≥ 0. However, in the presence of habits, it does
not seem feasible to use the (much more complex) dynamic programming principle (30) to
derive the required monotonicity of c0(0). Namely, the presence of the cumbersome term
−
T∑
k=1
β
(k)
0 E
[
u′k(c(k, β, h, π(0)))
]
,
makes the analysis significantly more complicated and other methods have to be developed.
Note also that the other desirable inequality c′0(0) ≤ 1 does not follow from (30) even in
the case without habits.
4.2 Explicit solution and monotonicity
We provide an explicit solution to the utility maximization problem and study the asso-
ciated monotonicity issues of the optimal consumption/investment policy, in the setting of
arbitrary incomplete markets with a deterministic interest rate, and for arbitrary idiosyncrat-
ically (incomplete) markets. We begin with a concise description of the later type of markets.
For some related works involving the concept of idiosyncratic source of risk, the reader is
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addressed to Duffie et al. [12], Hendersen [19], Malamud [24] and Malamud and Trubowitz
[25].
Definition 4.1 A financial market is called idiosyncratically incomplete, if there exist two
filtrations (Fk)k=0,...,T and (Gk)k=0,...,T such that:
(i) F0 = G0 = {∅,}, and Fk ⊆ Gk , for all k = 1, . . . , T .
(ii) The market is complete with respect to F , and the endowment stream (k)k=0,...,T is
adapted with respect to G.
(iii) For each k = 0, . . . , T −1, and an arbitrary random variable X ∈ L2 (Fk+1), we have
E [X |Gk] = E [X |Fk] .
Lemma 4.1 For an arbitrary idiosyncratically incomplete market, we have
(i) For each k = 1, . . . , T , the financial wealth space is given by
Lk = L2 (σ (Gk−1,Fk)) ,
and, in particular, PLk [·] = E
[·|σ (Gk−1,Fk)
]
.
(ii) The aggregate SPD is a positive process, adapted with respect to F . Moreover, the
aggregate SPD coincides with the unique positive SPD that represents the same finan-
cial market with the filtration F .
Proof of Lemma 4.1 See the proof of Propositions 4.2 and 4.3 in Malamud and Trubowitz
[25]. unionsq
The main result of this section heavily relies on the following important algebraic identities,
leading to a severe simplification of the first order Eq. 7.
Lemma 4.2 For a given incomplete market with a deterministic interest rate, or for an
idiosyncratically incomplete market, the first order conditions (7) are equivalent to
PkL
[
u′k (c(k, β, hk))
] = M˜k
M˜kt−1
u′k−1 (c(k − 1, β, hk−1)) , (32)
for all k = 1, . . . , T, where the aggregate perturbed SPD (M˜k)k=1,...,T is defined in (9).
Proof of Lemma 4.2 The proof is based on the following simple observations: For mar-
kets with a deterministic interest rate, one checks that the quantities E[ MkMk−1 |Gk−1] and
E[ M˜kM˜k−1 |Gk−1], are positive and deterministic, for all k = 1, . . . , T ; for idiosyncratically
incomplete markets, the aggregate perturbed SPD satisfies: M˜k ∈ Fk , for all k = 1, . . . , T .
We provide a unified proof for both cases. For the sake of brevity, we set ĉk := c(k, β, hk),
for k = 0, . . . , T . Consider Eq. 7 for k = T :
PTL
[
u′T (̂cT )
] = MT
MT−1
(
u′T−1(̂cT−1) − β(T )T−1 E
[
u′T (̂cT )|GT−1
] )
. (33)
An application of the conditional expectation E[·|GT−1] to both sides of this equation yields
E
[
u′T (̂cT )|GT−1
] = E
[
MT |GT−1
]
MT−1 + β(T )T−1 E
[
MT |GT−1
]u′T−1(̂cT−1),
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and by plugging this back into (33), one concludes that (32) holds for k = T . Next, in
the idiosyncratically incomplete case, one can combine the preceding formula with prop-
erty (i) in Lemma 4.1 (in the deterministic interest rate case, one can exploit the fact that
MT−1
MT−1+β(T )T−1 E[MT |GT−1]
is a positive constant), to check that Eq. 7 admits the following form,
for k = T − 1,
MT−1
MT−1 + β(T )T−1 E
[
MT |GT−1
] PT−1L
[
u′T−1 (̂cT−1)
]
= MT−1
MT−2
(
u′T−2 (̂cT−2) − E
[(
β
(T−1)
T−2 + β(T )T−2
M˜T
M˜T−1
)
u′T−1(̂cT−1)|GT−1
])
.
Now, one can multiply the above equation by
E
[
β
(T−1)
T−2 + β(T )T−2
M˜T
M˜T−1
|GT−1
] MT−1 + β(T )T−1 E
[
MT |GT−1
]
MT−1
,
apply then the conditional expectation E
[·∣∣GT−2
]
to both sides of the resulted equation, and
proceed as follows to conclude the validity of (32), for k = T − 1: In the idiosyncratically
incomplete case, one can use property (iii) in Definition 4.1 and the identity X PkL [Y ] =
PkL [XY ], which holds for all Y ∈ L2(GT ), X ∈ L2(Fk), and all k = 1, . . . , T ; in the
deterministic interest rate case, one can use the fact that E
[
β
(T−1)
T−2 + β(T )T−2 M˜TM˜T−1 |GT−1
]
and MT−1+β
(T )
T−1 E[MT |GT−1]
MT−1 are positive constants. The rest of the proof follows by similar
arguments and induction. unionsq
Now, we present the main result of this section.
Theorem 4.1 Consider the utility maximization problem (4) in the setting of an incomplete
market with a deterministic interest rate, or an idiosyncratically incomplete market. Then,
we have
c∗T = ψT
(
W ∗T
)
,
c∗k = ψk
(
W ∗k , c∗k−1, . . . , c∗0
)
,
for k = 1, . . . , T − 1, and
c∗0 = ψ0 (0) ,
W ∗k = ηk
(
c∗k−1, . . . , c∗0
)
,
for k = 2, . . . , T , and
W ∗1 = η1
(
c∗0
)
,
where the functions ψT , (ψk)k=0,...,T−1 and (ηk)k=1,...,T are given in (34), (53), (55) and
(57). Furthermore, a monotonicity property of the optimal consumption holds in the follow-
ing form: The differential of ψk , for k = 1, . . . , T , with respect to Wk is a multiplication
operator that satisfies:
0 <
∂ψk
∂Wk
≤ 1
1 + ∑Tj=k+1
(∑ j
i=k β
i
kβ
i+1
i · · ·β jj−1
)
E
[
M j
Mk
∣∣Gk
] ,
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for k = 1, . . . , T, and
0 < ψ ′0(0) ≤
1
1 + ∑Tj=1
(∑ j
i=0 β
i
0β
i+1
i · · ·β jj−1
)
E
[
M j
∣
∣Gk
] .
Remark As in the proof of Lemma 4.2, we present a unified approach that treats both mar-
kets with a deterministic interest rate and idiosyncratically incomplete markets. As one can
notice, the additive habits structure in our model generate an essential distinction between the
interaction of the optimal consumption/investment rules in the last two periods. The reason
for this comes from the fact that the consumption at the maturity has no impact on future con-
sumption. Therefore, we focus on proving the statement for the periods k = T −2, T −1, T ,
which constitutes the core of Theorem 4.1. The rest is then concisely explained, and can be
proved by induction, without any further machinery.
Proof of Theorem 4.1 To simplify notations, we set ĉ∗k := c∗k −
∑k−1
l=0 β
(k)
l c
∗
l − hk, for
all k = 0, . . . , T . For an arbitrary consumption stream (ck)k=0,...,T , as in (3), we denote
ĉk := c(k, β, h) = ck − ∑k−1l=0 β(k)l cl − hk, for all k = 0, . . . , T .
The case k = T . Let ψT : L2(GT ) → L2(GT ) be a function defined by
ψT (X) := T + X. (34)
Observe that relation (8), for k = T , implies that c∗T = ψT (W ∗T ). Furthermore, dψT = 1.
Next, consider the function
fT (c0, . . . , cT−1, WT ) = PTL
[
u′T
(
ψT (WT ) −
T−1∑
l=0
β
(T )
l cl − hT
)]
− M˜T
M˜T−1
u′T−1 (̂cT−1) , (35)
defined on the set B ′T ⊆ L2(G0) × · · · × L2(GT−1) × LT consisting of all tuples
(c0, . . . , cT−1, WT ) such that ψT (WT )−∑T−1l=0 β(T )l cl −hT ≥ 0 and ĉT−1 ≥ 0, P−a.s. Note
that Lemma 4.2 implies that fT (c∗0, . . . , c∗T−1, W ∗T ) = 0. Furthermore, the differential of fT
with respect to WT , at some (c0, . . . , cT−1, WT ) ∈ int (BT ) , ∂ fT∂WT :=
∂ fT
∂WT (c0,...,cT−1,WT )
,
applied on some vector V ∈ LT , V 
= 0, is given by
∂ fT
∂WT
V = PTL
[
u′′T
(
ψT (WT ) −
T−1∑
l=0
β
(T )
l cl − hT
)
V
]
.
Note that part (iii) of Lemma 2.1 yields
E
[
V
∂ fT
∂Wk (c0,...,cT−1,WT )
V
∣∣GT−1
]
= E
[
u′′T
(
ψT (WT ) −
T−1∑
l=0
β
(T )
l cl − hT
)
V 2
∣∣GT−1
]
< 0,
where the last inequality follows by the concavity of uT . This in particular implies that the
operator
∂ fT
∂WT (c∗0 ,...,c∗T−1,W ∗T )
: LT → LT ,
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which is given by
∂ fT
∂WT (c∗0 ,...,c∗T−1,W ∗T )
V := PLT
[
u′′T
(
ĉ∗T
)
V
]
is non-degenerate. The implicit function theorem implies that there exists an open neighbor-
hood DT−1 of (c∗0, . . . , c∗T−1) (in the L2(G0) × · · · × L2(GT−1)−topology) and a unique
C1−function ηT : DT−1 → LT such that
fT (c0, . . . , cT−1, ηT (c0, . . . , cT−1)) = 0, (36)
for all (c0, . . . , cT−1) ∈ DT−1. We will compute now certain differentials that will be crucial
for proving the statement in the phase: k = T − 1. A differentiation of (36) with respect to
cT−1 and ck, k = 0, . . . , T − 2, combined with item (ii) of Lemma 2.1, implies the validity
of the following identities,
PTL
[
u′′T
(
ψT (ηT (c0, . . . , cT−1)) −
T−1∑
l=0
β
(T )
l cl − hT
)(
∂ηT
∂cT−1
V − β(T )T−1V
)]
= M˜T
M˜T−1
u′′T−1 (̂cT−1) V, (37)
for all random variables V ∈ L2(GT−1), and
PTL
[
u′′T
(
ψT (ηT (c0, . . . , cT−1)) −
T−1∑
l=0
β
(T )
l cl − hT
)(
1
W
∂ηT
∂ck
W − β(T )k
)]
= −β(T−1)k
M˜T
M˜T−1
u′′T−1 (̂cT−1) , (38)
for all non-vanishing random variables W ∈ L2(Gk), k = 0, . . . , T − 2, where ∂ηT∂cT−1 :=
∂ηT
∂cT−1 (c0,...,cT−1)
and ∂ηT
∂ck
:= ∂ηT
∂ck (c0,...,cT−1)
. Therefore, by multiplying Eqs. 37 and 38 by
β
(T−1)
k and V respectively, applying property (ii) in Lemma 2.1, and summing up these
equations, we obtain
PTL
[
u′′T
(
ψT (ηT (c0, . . . , cT−1)) −
T−1∑
l=0
β
(T )
l cl − hT
)
·
(
β
(T−1)
k
∂ηT
∂cT−1
V + V
W
∂ηT
∂ck
W
)]
= PTL
[
u′′T
(
ψT (ηT (c0, . . . , cT−1)) −
T−1∑
l=0
β
(T )
l cl − hT
)(
β
(T−1)
k β
(T )
T−1 + β(T )k
)
V
]
,
and thus by part (iv) of Lemma 2.1, it follows that
∂ηT
∂cT−1
V = 1
β
(T−1)
k
(
β
(T−1)
k β
(T )
T−1 + β(T )k −
1
W
∂ηT
∂ck
W
)
V . (39)
By employing similar arguments, one can check that Eq. 38 implies that
∂ηT
∂ck
W =
(
β
(T )
k +
β
(T−1)
k
β
(T−1)
m
(
1
Y
∂ηT
∂cm
Y − β(T )m
))
W, (40)
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for all k, m = 0, . . . , T − 2, W ∈ L2 (Gk−1) and all non-vanishing random variables Y ∈
L2 (Gm−1) . In particular we deduce that ∂ηT∂cT−1 , and
∂ηT
∂ck
, for k = 0, . . . , T − 2, are multipli-
cation operators (and thus can be treated as random variables). That is, we can rewrite (39)
as
∂ηT
∂cT−1
= 1
β
(T−1)
k
(
β
(T−1)
k β
(T )
T−1 + β(T )k −
∂ηT
∂ck
)
. (41)
The case k = T − 1. We set the function
gT−1 : DT−1 × LT−1 → L2 (GT−1) ,
gT−1(c0, . . . , cT−1, WT−1) = cT−1 + E
[
MT
MT−1
ηT (c0, . . . , cT−1)|GT−1
]
−WT−1 − T−1,
and note that by (8), gT−1(c∗0, . . . , c∗T−1, W ∗T −1) = 0. Let
∂gT−1
∂cT−1
:= ∂gT−1
∂cT−1 (c0,...,cT−1,WT−1)
: L2 (GT−1) → L2 (GT−1) ,
be the derivative, which is given by
∂gT−1
∂cT−1
V = V + E
[
MT
MT−1
∂ηT
∂cT−1
V
∣∣GT−1
]
,
for all V ∈ L2(GT−1). Observe that
E
[
V
∂gT−1
∂cT−1
V |GT−1
]
= V 2 + E
[
MT
MT−1
V
∂ηT
∂cT−1
V |GT−1
]
.
Let us show that E
[
MT
MT−1 V
∂ηT
∂cT−1 V |GT−1
]
> 0, for V 
= 0. By (41), we have
E
[
MT
MT−1
V
∂ηT
∂cT−1
V |GT−1
]
= β(T )T−1 E
[
MT
MT−1
|GT−1
]
V 2 + 1
β
(T−1)
k
E
[
MT
MT−1
(
β
(T )
k −
∂ηT
∂ck
)
|GT−1
]
V 2.
Recall that E
[
MT
MT−1 |GT−1
]
denotes the interest rate at period T −1, and thus it is in particular
a positive quantity. Thereby, it suffices to show that
E
[
MT
MT−1
(
β
(T )
k −
∂ηT
∂ck
)
|GT−1
]
> 0.
In virtue of (38), this is equivalent to showing that
1
β
(T−1)
k u
′′
T−1 (̂cT−1)
E
[
MT
M˜T
MT−1
M˜T−1
(
β
(T )
k −
∂ηT
∂ck
)
×PTL
[
u′′T
(
ψT (ηT (c0, . . . , cT−1)) −
T−1∑
l=0
β
(T )
l cl − hT
)
×
(
β
(T )
k −
∂ηT
∂ck
)]∣∣GT−1
]
> 0. (42)
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To this end, let us first prove it for the deterministic interest rate case, and then for idiosyncrat-
ically incomplete markets. Note that in the former case, the quantities Mk
M˜K
, k = 1, . . . , T are
positive numbers, and hence, since β(T )k − 1W ∂ηT∂ck W ∈ LT , part (iii) of Lemma 2.1, implies
that (42) is equivalent to
E
[
u′′T
(
ψT (ηT (c0, . . . , cT−1)) −
T−1∑
l=0
β
(T )
l cl − hT
)(
β
(T )
k −
∂ηT
∂ck
)2 ∣
∣GT−1
]
< 0,
which holds true since uT is a concave function. For idiosyncratically incomplete mar-
kets, notice first that the ratio Mk
M˜k
is positive, for all k = 1, . . . , T . Next, since PLk [·] =
E
[·∣∣σ (Gk−1,Fk)
]
, it follows that PLk [XY ] = X PLk [Y ] holds, for all Y ∈ L2 (GT ) and
X ∈ Lk = L2 (σ (Gk−1,Fk)) . By exploiting these observations, one easily checks that (42)
is equivalent to
E
[
u′′T
(
ψT (ηT (c0, . . . , cT−1)) −
T−1∑
l=0
β
(T )
l cl − hT
)
×
(
β
(T )
k −
∂ηT
∂ck
)2 ∣∣σ (Gk−1,Fk)
]
< 0, (43)
which is evidently satisfied. Therefore, it follows that the operator
∂gT−1
∂cT−1 (c∗0 ,...,c∗T−1,W ∗T−1)
: L2 (GT−1) → L2 (GT−1) ,
which is given by
∂gT−1
∂cT−1 (c∗0 ,...,c∗T−1,W ∗T−1)
V
= V + E
[
MT
MT−1
∂ηT
∂cT−1 (c∗0 ,...,c∗T−2,W ∗T−1)
V
∣∣GT−1
]
is non-degenerate. The implicit function theorem implies that there exists an open neighbor-
hood BT−1 of (c∗0, . . . , c∗T 2, W ∗T−1) (in the L2(G0) × · · · × L2(GT−2) × LT−1−topology)
and a unique C1−function ψT−1 : BT−1 → L2(GT−2) such that
gT−1(c0, . . . , cT−2, ψT−1(c0, . . . , cT−2, WT−1), WT −1) = T−1(c0, . . . , cT−2, WT−1)
+E
[
MT
MT−1
ηT (c0, . . . , cT−2, ψT−1(c0, . . . , cT−2, WT −1))
∣∣GT−1
]
− WT−1 − T−1 = 0,
for all (c0, . . . , cT 2, WT−1) ∈ BT−1. By differentiating the above equation with respect
to WT−1 and ck, k = 0, . . . , T − 2, and using the fact that both ∂ηT∂cT−1 and
∂ηT
∂ck
are mul-
tiplicative operators, we obtain that both ∂ψT−1
∂WT−1 :=
∂ψT−1
∂WT−1 (c0,...,cT−2,WT−1)
and ∂ψT−1
∂ck
:=
∂ψT−1
∂ck (c0,...,cT−2,WT−1)
are multiplicative operators given explicitly by
∂ψT−1
∂WT−1
= 1
1 + E
[
MT
MT−1
∂ηT
∂cT−1 (c0,...,cT−2,ψT−1(c0,...,cT−2,WT−1),WT−1)
|GT−1
] , (44)
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and
∂ψT−1
∂ck
=
−E
[
MT
MT−1
∂ηT
∂ck (c0,...,cT−2,ψT−1(c0,...,cT−2,WT−1),WT−1)
|GT−1
]
1 + E
[
MT
MT−1
∂ηT
∂cT−1 (c0,...,cT−2,ψT−1(c0,...,cT−2,WT−1),WT−1)
|GT−1
] . (45)
Unless unavoidable, we will henceforth omit the indexes in the derivatives. Next, we define
the function,
fT−1(c0, . . . , cT−2, WT −1) = − M˜T−1M˜T−2
u′T−2 (̂cT−2)
+PT−1L
[
u′T−1
(
ψT−1(c0, . . . , cT−2, WT−1) −
T−2∑
k=0
β
(T−1)
k ck − hT−1
)]
,
on the set BT−1, which consists of all tuples (c0, . . . , cT−2, WT−1) ∈ L2 (G0) × · · · ×
L2 (GT−2) × LT−1 such that ψT−1(c0, . . . , cT−2, WT−1) − ∑T−2k=0 β(T−1)k ck − hT−1 ≥ 0
and ĉT−2 ≥ 0. Observe that
∂ fT−1
∂WT−1
V
= PT−1L
[
u′′T−1
(
ψT−1(c0, . . . , cT−2, WT−1) −
T−2∑
k=0
β
(T−1)
k ck − hT−1
)
∂ψT−1
∂WT−1
V
]
,
for all V ∈ LT−1. By item (iii) in Lemma 2.1, it follows that
E
[
V
∂ fT−1
∂WT−1
V
∣∣GT−2
]
= E
[
u′′T−1
(
ψT−1(c0, . . . , cT−2, WT−1)−
T−2∑
k=0
β
(T−1)
k ck−hT−1
)
× ∂ψT−1
∂WT−1
V 2
∣∣GT−2
]
< 0,
where the last inequality follows by the concavity of uT−1 and the fact that ∂ψT−1∂WT−1 > 0,
which holds due to (44). Therefore, we conclude that the differential
∂ fT−1
∂WT−1 (c∗0 ,...,c∗T−2,W ∗T−1)
: LT−1 → LT−1,
which is given by
∂ fT−1
∂WT−1 (c∗0 ,...,c∗T−2,W ∗T−1)
V = PT−1L
[
u′′T−1
(
ĉ∗T−1
) ∂ψT−1
∂WT−1 (c∗0 ,...,c∗T−2,W ∗T−1)
V
]
is non-degenerate. The implicit function theorem implies the existence of an open neighbor-
hood DT−2 of (c∗0, . . . , c∗T−2) (in the L2(G0) × · · · × L2(GT−2)−topology) and a unique
C1−function ηT−1(c0, . . . , cT−2) : DT−2 → LT−1, such that
fT−1(c0, . . . , cT−2, ηT−1(c0, . . . , cT−2)) = 0,
for all (c0, . . . , cT−2) ∈ DT−2. We shall compute now some differentials and establish
related identities that we will find useful in the subsequence phases. By differentiating the
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above equation with respect to cT−2 and then ck, k = 0, . . . , T − 3, one checks that the
following is satisfied:
PT−1L
[
u′′T−1
(
ψT−1(c0, . . . , cT−2, WT−1) −
T−2∑
k=0
β
(T−1)
k ck − hT−1
)
×
(
∂ψT−1
∂cT−2
· V + ∂ψT−1
∂WT−1
· ∂ηT−1
∂cT−2
V − β(T−1)T−2 · V
)]
= M˜T−1
M˜T−2
u′T−2 (̂cT−2) · V, (46)
for all V ∈ L2 (GT−2) , and
PT−1L
[
u′′T−1
(
ψT−1(c0, . . . , cT−2, WT−1) −
T−2∑
k=0
β
(T−1)
k ck − hT−1
)
×
(
∂ψT−1
∂ck
+ ∂ψT−1
∂WT−1
· 1
W
∂ηT−1
∂ck
W − β(T−1)k
)]
= −β(T−2)k
M˜T−1
M˜T−2
u′T−2 (̂cT−2) , (47)
for all non-vanishing vectors W ∈ L2 (Gk) , k = 0, . . . , T − 3. Similarly as in (39) and (40),
by part (iv) of Lemma 2.1, we obtain that
β
(T−2)
k
(
∂ψT−1
∂cT−2
· V + ∂ψT−1
∂WT−1
· ∂ηT−1
∂cT−2
V − β(T−1)T−2 · V
)
+
(
∂ψT−1
∂ck
+ 1
W
∂ψT−1
∂WT−1
· ∂ηT−1
∂ck
W − β(T−1)k
)
· V = 0,
or equivalently
∂ηT−1
∂cT−2
=
(
β
(T−1)
T−2 −
∂ψT−1
∂cT−2
− 1
β
(T−2)
k
(
∂ψT−1
∂ck
+ 1
W
∂ψT−1
∂WT−1
· ∂ηT−1
∂ck
W − β(T−1)k
))
1
∂ψT−1
∂WT−1
.
We turn now to a simplification of some terms in the brackets above,
β
(T−1)
T−2 −
∂ψT−1
∂cT−2
=
β
(T−1)
T−2 + E
[
MT
MT−1
(
β
(T−1)
T−2
∂ηT
∂cT−1 +
∂ηT
∂cT−2
) ∣∣GT−1
]
1 + E
[
MT
MT−1
∂ηT
∂cT−1
∣∣GT−1
]
=
β
(T−1)
T−2 +
(
β
(T−1)
T−2 β
(T )
T−1 + βT(T−2)
)
E
[
MT
MT−1
∣∣GT−1
]
1 + E
[
MT
MT−1
∂ηT
∂cT−1
∣∣GT−1
] , (48)
where the first equation follows by (45) and the second one is due to (40). Next, by (44), (45)
and (40), we have
X := 1
∂ψT−1
∂WT−1
(
∂ψT−1
∂ck
− β(T−1)k +
1
W
∂ψT−1
∂WT−1
· ∂ηT−1
∂ck
W
)
= −E
[
MT
MT−1
(
∂ηT
∂ck
+ β(T−1)k
∂ηT
∂cT−1
) ∣∣GT−1
]
+ 1
W
∂ηT−1
∂ck
W
= −
(
β
(T−1)
k β
(T )
T−1 + β(T )k
)
E
[
MT
MT−1
∣∣GT−1
]
+ 1
W
∂ηT−1
∂ck
W. (49)
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Note that the above computation implies in particular that X ∈ LT−1, in both cases of a
deterministic interest rate and idiosyncratically incomplete markets. Indeed, in both cases
1
W
∂ηT−1
∂ck
W ∈ LT−1. In the former case, E
[
MT
MT−1
∣
∣GT−1
]
is a real number indicating the
interest rate, and in the latter case, we have E
[
MT
MT−1
∣
∣GT−1
]
= E
[
MT
MT−1
∣
∣FT−1
]
∈ LT−1 :=
L2 (σ (GT−2,FT−1)), by item (iii) in Definition 4.1, and Lemma 4.1. Therefore, by (48) and
(49), we have
∂ηT−1
∂cT−2
= − 1
β
(T−2)
k
X + β(T−1)T−2 +
(
β
(T−1)
T−2 β
(T )
T−1 + β(T )T−2
)
E
[
MT
MT−1
∣
∣GT−1
]
.
Let us show that E
[
−X MT−1MT−2
∣
∣GT−2
]
> 0. This will imply that
E
[
∂ηT−1
∂cT−2
MT−1
MT−2
∣
∣GT−2
]
> β
(T−1)
T−2 E
[
MT−1
MT−2
∣
∣GT−2
]
+
(
β
(T−1)
T−2 β
(T )
T−1 + β(T )T−2
)
E
[
MT
MT−2
∣
∣GT−2
]
. (50)
One checks by using relation (47) that the claim is equivalent to
E
[
X
MT−1
MT−2
M˜T−2
M˜T−1
1
u′′T−2 (̂cT−2)
PLT−1
[
u′′T−1 (Y )
∂ψT−1
∂WT−1
X
] ∣∣∣∣GT−2
]
> 0, (51)
where,
Y := ψT−1(c0, . . . , cT−2, WT−1) −
T−2∑
k=0
β
(T−1)
k ck − hT−1.
For a market with a deterministic interest-rate, recall that M˜kMk , is a positive number, for each
k. Therefore, since X ∈ LT−1, part (iii) of Lemma 2.1 implies that (47) is equivalent to
E
[
∂ψT−1
∂WT−1
X2u′′T−1 (Y )
∣∣GT−2
]
< 0,
which holds true due to the assumption that uT−1 is a concave function and that ∂ψT−1∂WT−1 ≥ 0,
by (44). For idiosyncratically incomplete markets, since M˜kMk is a positive random variable,
for each k, and the operator PT−1L is a conditional expectation, we conclude (as in (43)) that
the validity of (51) is equivalent to verifying that
E
[
u′′T−1 (Y )
∂ψT−1
∂WT−1
X2
∣∣∣∣σ (GT−2,FT−1)
]
< 0,
which is satisfied due to the concavity of uT−1.
The General Case. First, let us prove the statement for k = T − 2 by exploiting the above
results, and then briefly describe the general case, which is treated analogously. Consider the
function
gT−2 : DT−2 × LT−2 → L2 (GT−2) ,
gT−2(c0, . . . , cT−2, WT−2)
= cT−2 + E
[
MT−1
MT−2
ηT−1 (c0, . . . , cT−2)
∣∣GT−2
]
− WT−2 − T−2,
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and note that (50) implies that ∂gT−2
∂cT−2 (c∗0 ,...,c∗T−2,W ∗T−2
) : LT−2 → LT−2 is a non-degenerate
linear operator, and thus there exists a unique C1−differentiable function ψT−2 : BT−2 →
L2 (GT−2), such that
gT−2(c0, . . . , cT−3, ψT−2 (c0, . . . , cT−3, WT−2) , WT−2) = 0.
Observe that a differentiation of the above equation with respect to WT−2 combined with
(50), yields
∂ψT−2
∂WT−2
= 1
1 + E
[
MT−1
MT−2
∂ηT−1
∂cT−2
∣
∣GT−2
]
≤ 1
1 + β(T−1)T−2 E
[
MT−1
MT−2
∣
∣GT−2
]
+
(
β
(T−1)
T−2 β
(T )
T−1 + β(T )T−2
)
E
[
MT
MT−1
∣
∣GT−2
] . (52)
Finally, induction implies the existence of the following maps
fk : B ′k ⊆ L2 (G0) × · · · × L2 (Gk−1) × LT → LT ,
fk (c0, . . . , ck−1, Wk) = PkL
⎡
⎣u′k
⎛
⎝ψk (c0, . . . , ck−1, Wk) −
k−1∑
j=0
β
(k)
j c j − hk
⎞
⎠
⎤
⎦
− M˜k
M˜k−1
u′k−1 (̂ck−1) , (53)
for k = 1, . . . , T − 2, where B ′k is the set of all tuples (c0, . . . , ck−1, Wk) ∈ Bk such that
ψk (c0, . . . , ck−1, Wk) − ∑k−1j=0 β(k)j c j − hk ≥ 0 and ĉk−1 ≥ 0;
ηk : Dk−1 ⊆ L2 (G0) × · · · × L2 (Gk−1) → Lk (54)
such that
fk (c0, . . . , ck−1, ηk (c0, . . . , ck−1)) = 0,
for all (c0, . . . , ck−1) ∈ Dk−1, k = 1, . . . , T − 1, where Dk−1 is some open neighborhood
of
(
c∗0, . . . , c∗k−1
) (in the L2 (G0) × · · · × L2 (Gk−1)−topology);
gk−1 : Dk−1 × Lk−1 → L2 (Gk−1) (55)
gk−1 (c0, . . . , ck−1, Wk−1) = ck−1 + E
[
Mk
Mk−1
ηk (c0, . . . , ck−1)
∣∣Gk−1
]
− Wk−1 − k−1,
and
ψk−1 : Bk−1 → L2 (Gk−1) (56)
such that
gk−1 (c0, . . . , ck−2, ψk−1 (c0, . . . , ck−2, Wk−1) , Wk−1) = 0,
for k = 2, . . . , T − 1, where Bk−1 is some open neighborhood of
(
c∗0, . . . , c∗k−2, W ∗k−1
)
in
the L2 (G0) × · · · × L2 (Gk−2) × Lk−1−topology. In the last stage, we set
g0(c0, 0) = c0 + E [M1η1 (c0)] − 0,
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and
ψ0 : L2+ (G0) → L2+ (G0) , (57)
(where L2+ (G0) ∼= R+), such that
g0(c0, ψ0(0)) = 0,
for all 0 ∈ L2+ (G0) . This completes the proof. unionsq
A further extension of the main result dealing with a characterization of the response of the
wealth to consumption, for certain models of markets, is stated below.
Definition 4.2 An incomplete market is said to be of class C, if there exists an intermediate
filtration (Hk)k=1,...,T such that
Gk−1 ⊆ Hk ⊆ Gk,
and PkL
[ · ] = E[ · |Ht
]
, for all k = 1, . . . , T .
Theorem 4.2 For an incomplete market of type C with a deterministic interest rate, or for
an idiosyncratically incomplete market, under the notations of Theorem 4.1, we have
∂ηk+1
∂ck
≥
T∑
j=k+1
⎛
⎝
j∑
i=k
β ikβ
i+1
i · · ·β jj−1
⎞
⎠ E
[
M j
Mk+1
∣∣Gk+1
]
,
for all k = 0, . . . , T − 1.
As in the proof of Theorem 4.1, our approach is applicable in both models simultaneously.
We will prove the above statement for k = T, T −1, whereas the rest can be easily completed
by induction.
Proof of Theorem 4.2 The key idea of the proof is based on the algebraic identities devel-
oped in the proof of Theorem 4.1 combined with the observation that the operators PkL, k =
1, . . . , T, are conditional expectations in the setting of the current theorem. Observe that
identity (37) accepts the form
∂ηT
∂cT−1
= β(T )T−1 +
M˜T
M˜T−1
u′′T−1 (̂cT−1)
PTL
[
u′′T
(
ψT (ηT (c0, . . . , cT−1)) − ∑T−1l=0 β(T )l cl − hT
)] , (58)
proving the statement for k = T . Next, one can check by using identity (48), that (46) can
be transformed into
∂ηT−1
∂cT−2
= 1
∂ψT−1
∂WT−1
(
β
(T−1)
T−2 −
∂ψT−1
∂cT−2
)
+ M˜T−1
M˜T−2
× u
′
T−2 (̂cT−2)
PT−1L
[
∂ψT−1
∂WT−1 u
′′
T−1
(
ψT−1(c0, . . . , cT−2, WT −1) − ∑T−2k=0 β(T−1)k ck − hT−1
) ] . (59)
Now, note that identities (48) and (44) guarantee the validity of the assertion for the case
k = T − 1. This completes the proof. unionsq
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5 Concavity results in incomplete markets
In the previous section, arbitrary time-inconsistent utility functions served as generic pref-
erence functionals, since the monotonicity feature of the consumption was valid for a large
class of markets. As it is shown in the next two subsections, the concavity property of the
consumption is invalid for some elementary and deterministic models of complete markets,
when general preferences are involved. Therefore, we will further restrict ourselves only to
some particular preferences (time-consistent power utility functions), in order to ensure the
concavity property for a rich variety of financial markets (see Sect. 5.3).
5.1 A counterexample with time-inconsistent preferences
Consider a one-period complete market represented by the positive SPD: M0 = 1 and
some M1 > 0. Assume that the investor is represented by the utility functions u0(x) =
log x, u1(x) = −x−1 and ρ = 0.The endowments of the agent are denoted by 0 and 1;
the habit coefficient is assumed to be β(1)0 = 1; exogenous habits are not incorporated, i.e.,
h1 = 0. We let c0(0) and c1(0) represent the optimal consumption stream. By Theorem 3.3,
it follows that
c1(0) = c0(0) +
√
c0(0)M1.
The budget constraint c0(0) + E[M1c1(0)] = 0 + E[M11], implies that
c0(0) =
(√
4a0 + 4ac + b2 − b
2a
)2
,
where a = 1 + E[M1], b = E[M1√M1], and c = E[M11]. We have,
0 < c′0(0) =
1
a
√
4a0 + 4ac + b2 − b√
4a0 + 4ac + b2
< 1,
and
c′′0(0) = 2b
(
4a0 + 4ac + b2
)−3/2
> 0.
Thus c0(0) is a convex function.
5.2 Why only power utility functions?
Consider a one-period complete market which consists only of a single riskless bond paying
an interest rate r ∈ R+. Assume that the individual is represented by the initial endowment
0 > 0 and some time-consistent utility function u : R+ → R, which satisfies the Inada
conditions. We assume that no habits are involved. The corresponding utility maximization
problem is:
sup
0≤πo≤0
u
(
0 − π0
) + u(π0r
)
.
Let π0(0) and c0() := 0 − π0(0) denote the optimal portfolio and consumption respec-
tively. The first order conditions imply that π0 (0) is determined uniquely as the solution of
the equation F (0, π0(0)) = 0, where
F (0, π0) = ru′ (π0r) − u′ (0 − π0) ,
123
Math Finan Econ (2011) 5:67–99 95
and hence, we have
π0(0) = 0 − I (ru′(π0(0)r)),
where I (x) := (u′)−1(x). The next statement demonstrates that only power utility functions
imply the concavity of the consumption property.
Theorem 5.1 The function c0(0) is concave for all r ∈ R+, if and only if u(x) = c1 +
c2x1−γ , for arbitrary c1, c2 ∈ R and γ > 0. Furthermore, in this case,
c0(0) = r
1−1/γ
1 + r1−1/γ 0.
Therefore, the only possible form of concavity here, is linearity.
Proof of Theorem 5.1 Note that the concavity of c0(0) is equivalent to the convexity of
π0(0). Observe that the function π0(0) is increasing, since
π ′0(0) =
1
1 + r2 I ′(ru′(π0(0)))u′′(π0(0)r) > 0.
Therefore, it follows that the function π0(0) is convex for all r > 0, if and only if the
function h(r, x) := I (ru′(r x)) is concave with respect to the variable x , for all r > 0. Note
that
∂h
∂r
(r, x) = I ′(ru′(r x)) (u′(r x) + ru′′(r x)x) .
The identity I (u′(x)) = x, implies that I ′(u′(x)) = 1
u′′(x) , and thus
∂h
∂r
(r, x)|r=1 = x + u
′(x)
u′′(x)
.
On the other hand, since h(1, x) = 1, we have
∂h
∂r
(r, x)|r=1 = lim
r→1
h(r, x) − 1
r − 1 . (60)
The function h(r, x) is a concave function of x , for all r > 0, if and only if the function
h(r,x)−h(1,x)
r−1 is a concave function of x , for all r > 1, and a convex function of x , for all r < 1.
Therefore, it follows that x + u′(x)
u′′(x) is a pointwise limit of concave and convex functions, and
thus we have u
′(x)
u′′(x) = ax + b, for some a, b ∈ R. This implies that u′(x) = c|ax + b|1/a,
for some c ∈ R. The Inada condition u′(0) = ∞ implies that b = 0 and a < 0. Finally, we
conclude that u(x) = c1 + c2x1−γ , for some c1, c2 ∈ R and γ = −1/a, as required. unionsq
5.3 Concavity of the optimal consumption stream
We establish the concavity property of the optimal consumption stream for an agent whose
habit-forming preference are represented by a power utility, in the setting of arbitrary idi-
osyncratically incomplete markets, and markets of type C with a deterministic interest rate
(see Definition 4.2).
Theorem 5.2 Given an idiosyncratically incomplete market, or a market of type C with a
deterministic interest rate, and an agent represented by the utility functions uk(x) =
e−ρk x1−γ1−γ ,
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k = 0, . . . , T, ρ ≥ 0, γ ≥ 0, the optimal consumption is a concave function of wealth.
That is, under the notations of Theorem 4.1, we have
∂2ψk
∂2Wk
≤ 0,
for all k = 1, . . . , T − 1, and
ψ ′′0 (0) ≤ 0.
As in the proof of Theorem 4.1, we will provide a proof for the benchmark cases: k =
T − 1, T − 2. A proof for a general period can be carried out analogously. The proof applies
to both models of markets.
Proof of Theorem 5.2 A differentiation of Eq. 44 with respect to WT−1, yields
∂2ψT−1
∂2WT−1
= − 1
1 +
(
E
[
MT
MT−1
∂ηT
∂cT−1
∣∣GT−1
])2 E
[
MT
MT−1
∂2ηT
∂2cT−1
∂ψT−1
∂WT−1
∣
∣
∣∣GT−1
]
.
By differentiating Eq. 58 with respect to cT−1, we get
∂2ηT
∂2cT−1
= M˜T
M˜T−1
u′′′T−1 (X) PTL
[
u′′T (Y )
] − u′′T−1(X)PTL
[
u′′T (Y )
] ( ∂ηT
∂cT−1 − β
(T )
T−1
)
(
PTL
[
u′′T (Y )
])2 ,
where X := ĉT−1, and
Y := ψT (ηT (c0, . . . , cT−1)) −
T−1∑
l=0
β
(T )
l cl − hT .
Observe that we have explicitly exploited the fact that PTL [·] = E
[· ∣∣HT−1
]
for markets
of type C, and PTL [·] = E
[· ∣∣σ (GT−1,FT )
]
for idiosyncratically incomplete markets, by
taking the term
(
∂ηT
∂cT−1 − β
(T )
T−1
)
out of the brackets. Furthermore, recall that ∂ψT−1
∂WT−1 ≥ 0 by
Theorem 4.1, and note that Mk M˜k ≥ 0, k = 1, . . . , T , since MkM˜k ≥ 0 in the setting of both
markets. Consequently, in order to prove the statement for k = T − 1, it suffices to check
that
u′′′T−1 (X) PTL
[
u′′T (Y )
] − u′′T−1(X)PTL
[
u′′T (Y )
] ( ∂ηT
∂cT−1
− β(T )T−1
)
≥ 0,
which is, by (37), equivalent to
(
PTL
[
Y −1−γ
])2 ≤ X−γ PTL
[
Y −2−γ
] M˜T
M˜T−1
.
Notice now that Lemma 4.2 for k = T , implies that the above inequality can be rewritten as
(
PTL
[
Y −1−γ
])2 ≤ PTL
[
Y −2−γ
]
PTL
[
Y −γ
]
,
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which, by the fact that PTL [·] is a conditional expectation in the setting of both markets,
is satisfied by the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality. Next, let us treat the case: k = T − 2. A
differentiation of Eq. 52 with respect to WT−2 yields
∂2ψT−2
∂2WT−2
= − 1(
1 + E
[
MT−1
MT−2
∂ηT−1
∂cT−2
∣
∣GT−2
])2 E
[
MT−1
MT−2
∂2ηT−1
∂2cT−2
∂ψT−2
∂WT−2
∣
∣GT−2
]
,
and by differentiating Eq. 59 with respect to cT−2, we obtain that
∂2ηT−1
∂2cT−2
= M˜T−1
M˜T−2
1
(
PT−1L
[
u′′T−1(̂cT−1)
∂ψT−1
∂WT−1
])2
×
(
u′′′T−2 (̂cT−2)P
T−1
L
[
u′′T−1(̂cT−1)
∂ψT−1
∂WT−1
]
−u′′T−2 (̂cT−2)PT−1L
[
u′′′T−1(̂cT−1)
(
∂ψT−1
∂cT−2
+ ∂ψT−1
∂WT−1
∂ηT−1
∂cT−2
− β(T−1)T−2
)
∂ψT−1
∂WT−1
]
−u′′T−2 (̂cT−2)PT−1L
[
u′′′T−1(̂cT−1)
(
∂2ψT−1
∂2WT−1
∂ηT−1
∂cT−2
+ ∂
2ψT−1
∂WT−1∂cT−2
)])
.
We shall now simplify the above expression. By plugging (44) into (48), and by differentiating
the latter equation with respect to WT−1, we obtain that
∂2ψT−1
∂cT−2∂WT−1
= − ∂
2ψT−1
∂2WT−1
(
β
(T−1)
T−2 + E
[(
β
(T−1)
T−2
∂ηT
∂cT−1
+ ∂ηT
∂cT−2
)
MT
MT−1
∣∣GT−1
])
.
Therefore, we get
∂2ψT−1
∂2WT−1
∂ηT−1
∂cT−2
+ ∂
2ψT−1
∂WT−1∂cT−2
= ∂
2ψT−1
∂2WT−1
(
∂ηT−1
∂cT−2
− β(T−1)T−2 − E
[(
β
(T−1)
T−2
∂ηT
∂cT−1
+ ∂ηT
∂cT−2
)
MT
MT−1
∣∣GT−1
])
= ∂
2ψT−1
∂2WT−1
⎛
⎝ M˜T−1
M˜T−2
u′′T−2 (̂cT−2)
PT−1L
[
u′′T−1(̂cT−1)
∂ψT−1
∂WT−1
]
⎞
⎠ , (61)
where the last equality follows by combining relations (48), (44) and (59). Next, by (59), it
follows that
PT−1L
[
u′′′T−1(̂cT−1)
(
∂ψT−1
∂cT−2
+ ∂ψT−1
∂WT−1
∂ηT−1
∂cT−2
− β(T−1)T−2
)
∂ψT−1
∂WT−1
]
= PT−1L
⎡
⎣u′′′T−1(̂cT−1)
(
∂ψT−1
∂WT−1
)2 M˜T−1
M˜T−2
u′′T−2 (̂cT−2)
PT−1L
[
u′′T−1 (̂cT−1)
∂ψT−1
∂WT−1
]
⎤
⎦ .
Finally, by combining the above observations, it follows that in order to show that ∂
2ψT−2
∂2WT−2
≤ 0,
it suffices to check that
X−2−γ PT−1L
[
Y −1−γ ∂ψT−1
∂WT−1
]
− X−2−γ M˜T−1
M˜T−2
PT−1L
[
Y −2−γ
(
∂ψT−1
∂WT−1
)2]
[
Y −1−γ ∂ψT−1
∂WT−1
] ≤ 0,
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where X := ĉT−1 and Y := ĉT−2. By Lemma 4.2 for k = T − 1, the latter inequality is
equivalent to
X−2−γ PT−1L
[
Y −1−γ ∂ψT−1
∂WT−1
]
− X−2−2γ P
T−1
L
[
Y −γ
]
X−γ
PT−1L
[
Y −2−γ
(
∂ψT−1
∂WT−1
)2]
PT−1L
[
Y −1−γ ∂ψT−1
∂WT−1
] ≤ 0,
or equivalently
(
PT−1L
[
Y −1−γ ∂ψT−1
∂WT−1
])2
≤ PT−1L
[
Y −γ
]
PT−1L
[
Y −2−γ
(
∂ψT−1
∂WT−1
)2]
,
which is satisfied by the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality, since the projection PT−1L is a condi-
tional expectation in both settings of markets. unionsq
Acknowledgements I am grateful to my supervisor Semyon Malamud for very helpful discussions, and for
detailed comments on the preliminary version of the manuscript. I would also like to thank an anonymous
referee for useful remarks. Financial support by the Swiss National Science Foundation via the SNF Grant
PDFM2-120424/1 is gratefully acknowledged.
References
1. Abel, A.: Asset prices under habit formation and catching up with the Joneses. Am. Econ. Rev. 80, 38–
42 (1990)
2. Campbell, J.Y., Cochrane, J.: By force of habit: a consumption-based explanation of aggregate stock
market behavior. J. Polit. Econ. 107, 205–251 (1999)
3. Carroll, C., Kimball, M.: On the concavity of the consumption function. Econometrica 64(4), 981–
992 (1996)
4. Chan, Y., Kogan, L.: Catching up with the Joneses: heterogeneous preferences and the dynamics of asset
prices. J. Polit. Econ. 110, 1255–1285 (2002)
5. Chapman, D.A.: Habit formation and aggregate consumption. Econometrica 66(5), 1223–1230 (1998)
6. Constantinides, G.M.: Habit formation: a resolution of the equity premium puzzle. J. Polit.
Econ. 98(3), 519–543 (1990)
7. Dalang, R., Morton, A., Willinger, W.: Equivalent martingale measures and no-arbitrage in stochastic
securities market models. Stoch. Stoch. Rep. 29(2), 185–201 (1990)
8. Detemple, J., Karatzas, I.: Non-addictive habits: optimal consumption-portfolio policies. J. Econ. The-
ory 113, 265–285 (2003)
9. Detemple, J., Zapatero, F.: Asset prices in an exchange economy with habit formation. Econometri-
ca c59, 1633–1657 (1991)
10. Detemple, J., Zapatero, F.: Optimal consumption-portfolio policies with habit formation. Math.
Finan. 2(4), 251–274 (1992)
11. Duffie, D.: Dynamic Asset Pricing Theory. Princeton University Press, Princeton (2001)
12. Duffie, D., Fleming, W., Soner, H.M., Zariphopoulou, T.: Hedging in incomplete markets with HARA
utility. J. Econ. Dyn. Control 21, 753–781 (1997)
13. Englezos, N., Karatzas, I.: Utility maximization with habit formation: dynamic programming and sto-
chastic PDEs. SIAM J. Control Optim. 48(2), 481–520 (2009)
14. Ekeland, I., Lazrak, A.: The golden rule when preferences are time inconsistent. Math. Finan. Econ. 4,
29–55 (2010)
15. Gomes, F., Michaelides, A.: Portfolio choice with internal habit formation: a life-cycle model with unin-
surable labor income risk. Rev. Econ. Dynam. 6(4), 729–766 (2003)
16. Heaton, J.: Consumption and portfolio policies with incomplete markets and short-sale constraints: the
infinite-dimensional case. Econometrica 61(2), 353–385 (1993)
17. He, H., Pearson, N.D.: Consumption and portfolio policies with incomplete markets and short-sale con-
straints: the infinite-dimensional case. Math. Finan. 1, 1–10 (1991)
18. He, H., Pearson, N.D.: Consumption and portfolio policies with incomplete markets and short-sale con-
straints: the infinite-dimensional case. J. Econ. Theory 54, 259–304 (1991)
123
Math Finan Econ (2011) 5:67–99 99
19. Hendersen, V.: Explicit solutions to an optimal portfolio choice problem with stochastic income. J. Econ.
Dyn. Control. 29(7), 1237–1266 (2005)
20. Karatzas, I., Lehoczky, J.P., Shreve, S.E., Xu, G.L.: Martingale and duality methods for utility maximi-
sation in an incomplete market. SIAM J. Control Optim. 29, 702–730 (1991)
21. Karatzas, I., Žitkovic´ , G.: Optimal consumption from investment and random endowment in incomplete
semimartingale markets. Ann. Probab. 31(4), 1821–1858 (2003)
22. Karp, L.: Non-constant discounting in continuous time. J. Econ. Theory 132, 557–568 (2007)
23. Keynes, J.M.: The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge (1936)
24. Malamud, S.: Asset pricing for idiosyncratically incomplete markets. PhD Thesis, ETH Zurich, Diss.
ETH No. 16651 (2006)
25. Malamud, S., Trubowitz, E.: The structure of optimal consumption streams in general incomplete mar-
kets. Math. Finan. Econ. 1, 129–161 (2007)
26. Merton, R.: Optimum consumption and portfolio rules in a continuous time model. J. Econ. The-
ory 3(4), 373–413 (1971)
27. Pliska, S.: Introduction to Mathematical Finance: Discrete Time Models. Blackwell, Malden (1997)
28. Plott, C.: Rational choice in experimental markets. J. Bus. 59, S301–S327 (1986)
29. Polkovnichenko, V.: Life-cycle portfolio choice with additive habit formation preferences and uninsurable
labor income risk. Rev. Finan. Stud. 20(1), 83–124 (2007)
30. Rásonyi, M., Stettner, Ł.: On utility maximization in discrete-time market models. Ann. Appl. Pro-
bab. 15, 1367–1395 (2005)
31. Taqqu, M.S., Willinger, W.: The analysis of finite security markets using martingales. Adv. Appl. Pro-
bab. 19, 1–25 (1987)
32. Zariphopoulou, T.: Optimal asset allocation in a stochastic factor model—an overview and open prob-
lems. Adv. Finan. Model. Radon Ser. Comp. Appl. Math 8, 427–453 (2009)
123
